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Abstract—Ensuring communications security in Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSNs) is very vital because the security 
protocols therein, should be devised to work at the link layer. 
Theoretically, any link layer security protocol must support 
three vital security attributes viz. Confidentiality, Message 
Integrity and Replay protection.
However, in order to ensure lesser overhead, replay 
protection is often not incorporated as part of the link layer 
security framework. We argue here, that it is essential to 
implement replay protection at the link layer only and devise a 
simple scheme to do so. We first survey the common approaches 
to ensuring replay protection in conventional networks. We also 
implement the conventional algorithms for replay protection 
using the link layer framework for WSNs viz. TinySec as the 
underlying platform. Subsequently analyzing their limitations, 
we propose a novel Bloom-filter based replay protection 
algorithm for unicast communications. We show that our 
algorithm is better than the other contemporary approaches for 
ensuring replay protection in unicast communications in the 
WSNs.
Index Terms—Authentication, Encryption, Link Layer 
Security Protocols, Replay Protection, Wireless Sensor 
Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of the 
sensor nodes collaborating with each other to achieve a 
specific purpose. There are numerous applications for which 
the WSNs can potentially be employed. At the same time, the 
security and privacy issues in WSNs demand a critical 
examination. This is primarily due to the severe resource 
constraints that the basic building blocks of the WSNs viz. the 
sensor nodes, suffer from and the inherent higher resource 
demands that the conventional security algorithms exhibit. In 
addition, with the wireless, open-to-all communication 
paradigm followed by WSNs, this problem assumes larger 
proportions [1]. 
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Moreover, the WSNs follow the in-network processing 
oriented data-centric multihop communication, necessitating 
the security support therein, to be devised at the link layer, 
thereby significantly increasing the overall overhead [2]. The 
necessity of link layer security support also obviates the direct 
application of the conventional header-centric end-to-end 
security protocols viz. SSL[3], IPSec[4] in WSNs..
The security attributes desired in a link layer security 
architecture in WSNs are data confidentiality (mechanism: 
data encryption) and data integrity with data-origin 
authentication (mechanism: keyed hash functions) and 
message freshness with protection against the replayed 
packets. 
However, there is no unanimity on whether replay 
protection should be implemented at the link layer or at the 
application layer in WSNs. This is exemplified by the fact that
the popular link layer security architecture viz. TinySec [5]
and the link layer security architecture for body networks viz. 
SenSec [6] leave replay protection to be supported at the 
application layer. Both these architectures support security in 
unicast setup and use the Mica2 motes [7]. MiniSec [8] on the 
other hand implements replay protection at the link layer.  A 
recent attempt at devising the link layer security architecture
for the Moteiv’s Telos motes [9], MiniSec employs two 
different approaches to support replay protection viz. one to 
work in unicast mode and the other to work in the broadcast 
mode. 
Here, we argue first that the replay protection must indeed 
be implemented at the link layer and subsequently 
demonstrate that the approach that MiniSec employs for 
ensuring replay protection, in unicast setup viz. the 
Counter-based approach, suffers from scalability and 
synchronization concerns. Therefore, we attempt to explore
the alternatives for providing suitable anti-replay protection 
schemes and propose a simpler Bloom filter based scheme for 
the same.
In this paper our basic aims are 
(a) to justify the case for devising replay protection at the 
link layer in WSNs.
(b) to explore and describe the conventional techniques for 
ensuring replay protection.
(c) to adapt the conventional techniques for WSNs and 
implement them in the link layer framework.
(d) to present a sophisticated Bloom filter [10] based replay 
protection scheme in unicast setup and,
(e) to evaluate our scheme against the conventional 
techniques for doing so and justify analytically as well as 
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experimentally, the advantages in our algorithm.
Our experimental results clearly demonstrate that the 
proposed Bloom filter based algorithm works well, adding 
less than 10% of overhead in memory and 0.2% in energy, as 
compared to the one without replay protection. We also 
demonstrate that the proposed scheme in unicast setup is 
simpler than the one employed in MiniSec for broadcast 
communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, 
we discuss the necessary theoretical background describing 
the link layer security issues in the WSNs. In section 3, we 
present a survey of the conventional approaches for ensuring 
replay protection. In section 4, the approaches for replay 
protection in WSNs and the Bloom filter based approach for 
replay protection are discussed along with our design. In 
section 5, we discuss the methodology and tools employed for 
implementation whereas in section 6, we demonstrate and 
analyze the experimental results for various algorithms with 
respect to storage, computational and energy overhead. 
Finally, we conclude with the impact of our work and enlist 
the possibilities of future extensions and applications. 
II. SECURITY IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
In this section, we discuss the need for devising the security 
support at the link layer in WSNs and enlist the required 
security attributes.
A. Communication Paradigm in WSNs
The WSNs follow data-centric multihop communication 
paradigm instead of the conventional header-centric
multihop communication. The data-centric multihop 
communication relies on the in-network processing of the 
data. In-network processing is the processing of the sensed 
data, done on-the-fly, during the transmission of the data to 
the base station [5]. It consists of trivial but significant 
operations like summarization, duplicate elimination or 
aggregation of the data, done by the intermediate sensor 
nodes themselves, to reduce the total number of packets 
actually communicated to the base station. The principal 
advantage of such in-network processing is the overall 
reduced communication costs [5].
However, due to in-network processing, the conventional 
end-to-end security (e.g. SSL, IPSec) protocols, that do not 
compel the intermediate network nodes to observe the 
contents of the data packets; cannot be used in WSNs. Thus, 
with the need to investigate the data packets at each hop 
(data-centric multihop communication), the security support 
has to be implemented at the link layer.
However, due to the link layer security support, the overall 
resource overhead that has anyway increased due to the 
addition of security mechanisms, further increases. Therefore, 
it is essential to tune carefully, the security protocols for the 
link layer security architecture for WSNs. 
There indeed have been a significant number of attempts 
published in the literature, aimed at enriching the link layer 
protocol with the essential security mechanisms. We present 
characteristic details of such protocols later. However for 
now, we describe the principal goals of any link layer security 
architecture.
B. Goals of the link layer architecture
The security attributes desired from a link layer security 
solution for WSNs are 
(a) Confidentiality: Confidentiality of the data is achieved 
by encrypting it using a symmetric key block cipher. The data 
encryption can be achieved with a shared key k and the 
functions Ek(m) and Dk(m) for encryption and decryption 
respectively. That is, for the plain text m, the cipher text is 
given by c=Ek(m), whereas the plaintext is obtained by 
m=Dk(c). For such a symmetric key scheme, it is quite clear 
that the sender and the receiver must first secretly choose or 
exchange the key k, to be used subsequently.
(b) Data integrity:  Data integrity ensures that the data is 
not altered maliciously, during its transmission from the 
source to the destination. Typically, the un-keyed hash 
functions can be employed to ensure the data integrity. 
However, along with the data integrity, it is essential to 
ensure data origin (entity) authentication.  To achieve the 
data integrity as well as entity authentication, a keyed hash 
function, known as the Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
algorithm is employed. 
A MAC algorithm is typically a family of functions hk(k, x)
that takes a secret key and the message as input and generates
a MAC-value. If M is the input message, C is the MAC 
algorithm, K is the shared secret key and MAC is the message 
authentication code generated, then ( )KMAC C M .
The sender upon generating the MAC would send the 
message as 
M MAC = CK(M)
Fig. 1 Generic MAC packet format
The recipient upon receiving the message would use the 
same function CK with the same shared secret key K to 
compute the MAC value. If the computed MAC value and the 
received MAC value match, the integrity is verified 
otherwise, it is not. 
(c) Replay Protection: Replay protection ensures security 
against replay attacks. A replay attack is defined as an attack 
that is carried out on a security protocol by sending a packet 
that belongs to an earlier context, in the context that is 
current and under consideration. Since the packet is not 
modified in any way, the message integrity checks done by the 
recipient do not reveal that the packet is actually a replayed 
packet and not the genuine one. We formally present a 
discussion of replay attacks and the means of countering them 
in the next section.
(d) Message freshness: The message freshness parameter 
captures the gap between the transmission of data from the 
source and its delivery to the recipient. Message freshness can 
be either Strong freshness depicting a measure of time 
synchronization between the communicating entities or Weak
freshness depicting only ordering of the communication 
undertaken. Message replay protection is a special case of 
ensuring message freshness. 
(e) Availability: The security properties to be satisfied must 
not prevent the message from being available in time, to the 
recipient. For any security protocol, availability of the data to 
infer vital information is always of prime concern.
Fig. 2 TinySec in TinyOS protocol stack
(f) Low Overhead: The resource overhead concerns with 
the overall expenditure in computational, storage and energy
resources, due to the implementation of the security 
mechanisms. Naturally the algorithms used to implement the 
security properties do indeed entail some additional cost. In 
the resource constrained WSN environment, it is essential to 
ensure that this overhead is at the minimum, in order to 
optimize the cost/benefit ratio.
Having discussed the goals of the link layer security 
architecture, we now survey the existing implemented 
versions of the same.
C. Current Link Layer Security Architectures
The implementation platform that we use for proposing and 
evaluating the replay protection schemes is TinySec. Karlof et 
al in [5] present TinySec as a lightweight and efficient 
link-layer security protocol for WSNs. TinySec attempts to 
provide configurable link layer security with three different 
modes of operations, providing either (a) no security support 
or (b) support for message authentication only based on 
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code 
(CBC-MAC) [11] or (c) support for (b) and message 
confidentiality via encryption in Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) [12] mode. 
In the TinyOS protocol stack, TinySec can be viewed as 
shown in Fig. 2.  The TinySec protocol sits in between the 
Radio bytes layer and the Active Message (AM) layer of the 
operating system. Thus, whenever an AM packet is required 
to be transmitted securely, TinySec encrypts the data payload 
and generates a MAC.
The MAC is generated over the encrypted data and the 
packet header and is transmitted with the packet. In case the 
security mode selected is message authentication only, the 
MAC is generated over the data payload and the packet 
header, without packet encryption.
The modified packet is sent bit by bit by the radio 
component. When received at the other end, the bits pass 
through the RFM on to the Radio bytes layer and then 
authenticated and decrypted before being passed to the 
application layer. 
TinySec employs 80-bit key-sized Skipjack [13], as the 
default block cipher. We have used TinySec for our 
experimentation, because it is open-source and follows a 
modular plug-in oriented design so as to enable further 
experimentations. We must emphasize that our results are 
independent of the link layer protocol implementation i.e. we 
expect similar results when using any other protocol. 
SenSec [6] is another attempt at designing the link layer 
security framework for specific body monitoring application 
at the Institute of Infocomm Research, Singapore. Being 
designed for a specific application, it cannot be employed as a 
platform for further cryptographic experimentations. It also 
uses Skipjack as the block cipher with only 80-bit key size but 
with modified block cipher mode of operation. SenSec also 
does not support link layer replay protection.
TinySec and SenSec are devised for security support in 
only unicast communication mode.
MiniSec [8] is another recent attempt at designing the link 
layer security architecture. MiniSec also uses Skipjack as the 
block cipher. As mentioned earlier, MiniSec employs two 
different modes of operation to support the unicast and 
broadcast communications in WSNs. 
III. REPLAY PROTECTION: CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES
Formally, let a sender A, at time instant t1 has sent k packets
in the set T bearing sequence numbers viz. 
         TSEQ = {SEQ1, SEQ2, SEQ3,……SEQk}                  (1)
Let m be the number of packets that have been received by 
the receiver B. Due to the packet loss and out of order 
delivery, B might not receive all the packets that are 
transmitted. However, let 
                   R = {r2, r3, r6, r9……rm}                             (2)
be the packets received as per their order of arrival by the 
receiver B with their sequence numbers given by         
RSEQ = {SEQ2, SEQ3, SEQ6, SEQ9, …..SEQm} (m<k)      (3) 
To orchestrate a replay attack, the adversary would store 
any of the packets in the set of received packets R and replay 
them later. 
Replay attacks have been elaborately studied in the
conventional networks. In [14], Paul Syverson gives a 
detailed taxonomy of replay attacks, including the type and 
the level of the replay attacks. The focus in this paper is not on 
analysis of the techniques for preventing replay attacks but 
specifically on presenting a classification of attacks that is 
independent of the methods to tackle replay attacks.  Syverson 
fundamentally classifies the replay attacks in terms of two 
categories viz. the replay attack on the protocol run at the 
source and that at the destination. The former could be either 
replay of messages from outside the current run of the 
protocol or its counterpart, whereas,  the latter could be either 
deflection i.e. message being directed to other than the 
intended recipient, or reflection i.e. message being replayed
back to the origin or straight replay i.e. message being 
replayed to the intended recipient.
The theoretical solution for providing the replay protection 
is based on defining a temporal or causal relationship, 
between the properties of the message received at an instant 
and those of the messages received previously. Such 
relationship is required to be exploited to define an 
anti-replay protocol to handle a replay attack. 
In order to establish such relationship, some information 
about the message is required to be tagged with it, when the 
message is transmitted. In [15], U. Carlsen describes the types 
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CounterReplayDetect(CounterReceived,
                             NodeID)
{
1.  id = o;
2.  for id = 1 to lastValidId {
3.   if (id==NodeID) {
4.  if (CounterReceived <=
LastCount[NodeID])
5.   replayed = 1;
     else 
6.   replayed = 0;
7.  LastCount[NodeID]=CounterReceived;
     }
   }
}
Fig. 3 Antireplay Algorithm CounterReplayDetect
of information that can be tagged with the message viz. any 
one or all of  protocol identifier, protocol run identifier, 
primitive types of data items, transmission step identifier, 
message component identifier. 
In fact, there are wide and diverse approaches as regards to 
what information can be used as the basis to detect replay. 
T.Y.C. Woo and S.S. Lam in [16] propose the principle of full 
information, i.e. tagging all the information available with the 
sender, at the time of transmission of the message. 
Conversely, Aura in [17] proposes tagging only a hash of part 
of some data that is already known to the recipient. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the information tagged with 
the message, the anti-replay protocol must let the recipient 
determine whether the message received is a replayed 
message or not. As for example, when employing a 
transmission step identifier i.e. a counter, the sender tags 
incremental values of sequence numbers of the messages to 
each message transmitted. The protocol on the recipient node 
uses the received values of sequence numbers to determine 
whether the packet just received is a replayed or not. We 
formalize the algorithm that employs this method in Fig. 3.
This algorithm does not handle the packets received out of 
order at the recipient. To handle the same, it can be 
augmented with a sliding window that checks for the counter 
value within a defined window. 
When employing such counter based method in a network 
of n nodes, each node will have to maintain counter values for 
(n-1) other nodes and hence, if B bytes are required for one 
value of the counter, the total storage expended in all the 
nodes is 
CounterReplayDetectStorageOverhead  *( ( 1) / 2) B n n           (4)
Thus, if the network consists of only 50 nodes and two 
bytes are used for counter, then the total bytes expended is 
2450 bytes. This is approximately 5% of the total available 
RAM in Mica2 motes; implying that 5% of the total RAM is 
used only for handling one security attribute, irrespective of 
the cipher, the key-size and the MAC-size employed. Hence, 
there is need for exploring alternative techniques to ensure 
replay protection. 
Alternatively, other possible type tag identifier is a 
employing a time-stamp. This method is based on a local 
timestamp say {Tx}K   being affixed to the packet, by the 
sender X, sharing a symmetric key K with the recipient, at the 
time of transmission. The recipient node Y would decrypt the 
packet using the shared key K and compare the timestamp 
with its own local clock Ty. Based on the comparison, Y 
would treat the received packet as a fresh packet, only if 
according to its own judgment, the time drift |Ty – Tx| is 
sufficiently small. 
The issues associated with this approach are that the clock 
maintained by all the network nodes must be synchronized 
and the clock drifts amongst the nodes has to be accounted for 
by the recipient replay detection protocol.
Similar strategies to deal with the replay attacks in 
conventional networks have indeed been studied and 
analyzed significantly. 
In [18], Li Gong presents a discussion on the choice of 
identifying the freshness identifier, to be employed with the 
message. Gong analyzes the potential complexity in devising 
an anti replay algorithm based on the selection of the 
freshness identifiers.
In [19], Sreekanth Malladi, Jim Alves-foss and Robert B. 
Heckendorn present a simple protocol model for preventing 
replay attacks. They specifically address the issue of 
identifying the type tags to be attached to the message so as to 
identify a replayed packet. 
In [17], T. Aura discusses in general, a set of design 
principles that can be used to avoid replay attacks. In this 
attempt too, the focus is on identifying how to type-tag 
messages – including the Principle of Full information as 
referenced earlier - to ensure the detection of replay. Though a 
dated attempt, the author emphasizes that the design 
principles can be easily applied to real protocols, too.
A typical form of replay attack viz. session replay is 
discussed in [20]. A session replay is one, wherein the login 
ID and the password of genuine users, are captured to be 
re-used maliciously later by the adversary, to gain 
unauthorized access. The authors also discuss simple solution 
viz. entity authentication based on the One-Time-Password 
(OTP), to prevent such session replay attacks.
Having surveyed the conventional approaches to 
anti-replay, we now focus on the same in WSNs. 
IV. REPLAY PROTECTION IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
In this section, we first emphasize why is it worth investing 
in the extra resources, for ensuring replay protection in the 
resource starved sensor nodes; even though the temptation 
could be to omit it, because of the paucity of resources. We 
also show why replay protection should be implemented at the 
link layer only in WSNs. Subsequently we survey the current 
approaches to anti-replay in WSNs.  Later in section IV(C), 
we discuss the data structure used by us for replay protection.
A. Motivation for WSNs
Apart from the confidentiality and integrity (message & 
entity), in implementing the third security attribute for a link 
layer security architecture for WSNs, the protocol designer 
has three design alternatives available: 
(a)   Case 1: devising no anti-replay algorithm
(b) Case 2: implementing anti-replay algorithms to work at 
the application layer and not at the link layer 
(c)  Case 3: implementing such a algorithm within the link 
layer security protocol as one of its implicit goals.
We now consider the pros and cons of all the three cases.
Case 1: If due to the scarcity of overall resources in WSNs, 
anti-replay schemes are omitted, then, an adversary can 
cleverly exploit the lack of it, by replaying a genuine packet. 
For such replayed packets too, the recipient node would still 
carry out the data integrity check (e.g. using CBC-MAC [11] 
to verify the MAC) and then decrypt the valid packet. Upon 
decryption, the recipient node may or may not be able to 
identify the packet as the replayed packet. 
In case it identifies the packet as a replayed packet from the 
semantics of the data (which may not be the case in every 
occurrence of such event), it would have anyway wasted all of 
its precious resources thus far, in futile decryption and 
integrity checks on the received packet. 
In case, it is not able to detect it as a replayed packet then it 
can be every more serious proposition, as it would still waste 
its resources in further processing of such message. 
In either case, such wastage of resources should essentially 
be prevented in the resource starved sensor nodes.
Case 2: On the other hand, if the replay protection is 
ensured only at the application layer, then, with the 
data-centric multihop communication, the victim WSN may 
have routed, a packet replayed by an adversary, many hops, 
before it is detected. This kind of attack will again, waste
precious energy and bandwidth resources in the targeted 
nodes.
Case 3: As compared, if the link layer security architecture 
were designed with anti-replay protection built-in, it would be 
possible to detect a replayed packet, when it is first injected 
into the network; thereby saving not only the computational 
and storage resources; but also the precious energy.   
Thus, it is essential to devise anti-replay protection in the 
link layer security protocols only. We thus show that our 
experimental evaluations are indeed worth the efforts put in, 
to do so.  
B. Replay protection in WSNs
The principal attempts at devising link layer security 
framework in the WSNs are the SPINS [21], TinySec [5], 
SenSec [6] and MiniSec [8]. 
SNEP as part of SPINS is one of the first attempts at 
implementing a secure link layer protocol. It achieves replay 
protection by keeping a consistent counter between the sender 
and receiver. However, as was discussed in section III earlier 
and as our experimental results testify, a counter based 
approach is grossly inefficient in WSNs. 
In TinySec, the designers make an attempt at providing 
configurable security, by providing three different modes of 
operation wherein 
(a) either the application can be compiled to offer both the 
confidentiality and message integrity viz. TinySec_AE mode.
(b) or provide only message integrity viz. TinySec_Auth
mode.
(c) or do not enable any security features. 
However, as mentioned before, the designers of TinySec 
argue against devising any replay protection protocol at the 
link layer. We already disproved their argument before. 
MiniSec is a secure link layer protocol that serves to for 
provide, according to its designers, low energy consumption 
and high security. MiniSec provides two different strategies 
for anti-replay for its two different operating modes. 
For the unicast mode, a synchronized counter based 
approach is proposed. However, as we show in the next 
section, such scheme is not scalable with the increase in the 
number of nodes in the network. In addition, it requires costly 
resynchronization routines to be executed, when the counters 
shared, are desynchronized due to the out-of-order delivery of 
the packets. As against that, our sliding window based counter 
approach does not require any resynchronization to be done. 
However, our counter-based algorithm is not scalable, as in 
MiniSec. 
To handle scalability concerns, MiniSec indeed employs a 
Bloom Filter based approach with sliding window (in 
broadcast setup). However, since our focus is only on unicast 
communication, we consider and compare our results against 
only the unicast mode of MiniSec. 
C. The Bloom Filter
Bloom filter is a space-efficient data structure used for fast 
probabilistic membership tests. It is a way of employing a 
number of hash functions and to use their output, to determine 
the set membership on large data sets, efficiently [24]. 
Formally, a Bloom filter is a vector of n bits consisting of 
each individually addressable cells viz. a1, a2, a3, a4…..an
along with m different hash functions viz.  h1, h2, h3,……….hm.
Initially, the Bloom filter is empty with all its bits set to 0. 
To add a data element, say di, to the Bloom filter, each of 
the hash functions hj,  1<=j<=m is applied on di to get the 
hash values hvj. The vector addresses indexed by hvj in the 
bloom filter are then set to 1.
Subsequently, to query for the membership of a data
element di, the data element is again hashed with m hash 
functions to again get the m different hash values viz. hv1, hv2, 
hv3,……….hvm . If the bit at any of these hvj locations in the 
vector is 0, the element is considered to be not in the set. For, 
if the element were in the set, then all the bits corresponding to 
hvj would have been set to 1 when the element was initially 
inserted. 
Here, it is possible that the bit corresponding to a data 
element in the vector has been set to 1, during the insertion of 
other elements. This situation indicates a false positive i.e. an 
element being flagged as being in the set, even if actually it is 
not. 
On the other hand, a false negative i.e. the case where a 
query returns false, when the element is in fact a member of 
the set, is guaranteed to be not possible.
Now, this same approach employed for set membership 
tests can be used for detection of replayed packets too. In such 
a scenario, when a packet is first received by a node, the 
message tag in the packet is hashed by m hash functions under 
consideration and the corresponding bits in the Bloom vector 
are set. 
To test for replay, when the next packet is received, the 
same is hashed using the m hash functions and the 
corresponding bits in the vector are tested. As before, if the bit 
values are 1, the packet is a replayed packet, otherwise it is 
not.
Fig. 4 TinySec_AE Packet Format [5]
Fig. 5 TinySec_Auth Packet Format [5]
The fact that false positives are possible here means that if a 
packet is not a replayed packet, it may be identified as a 
replayed one. The sender may in that case have to re-transmit 
the same packet. However, the converse, that is, even if the 
packet is a replayed packet and is flagged as a genuine one is 
never possible. Therefore, the overall semantics of the 
protocol remain sacrosanct.
Bloom filters are well suited in the severe 
resource-constrained environment of sensor nodes. This is so, 
because they scale well with the increase in the number of 
network nodes, unlike other techniques. Asymptotically, only 
O(n log n) bits are required to store n messages. And, Bloom 
filters also exhibit the desirable property that adding and 
querying an element occurs in constant time.
V. OUR DESIGN
In this section, we discuss our design of various replay 
protection schemes employed for the implementation and 
subsequent evaluation, in the TinySec link layer framework.   
A. Approach 1: Counter based algorithm
As mentioned earlier, using a counter value as the message 
tag is one of the most common approaches for detecting 
packet replays. In order to apply this technique, it is necessary 
to decide and identify a suitable data structure to maintain the 
value of the counter. For this purpose, we exploit to an 
advantage, the packet format of a TinySec packet itself shown 
in fig. 4. 
For the TinySec_AE mode, in order to support both the 
encryption and message authentication, it is necessary to 
employ a block cipher mode of operation (e.g. the Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) mode [12]) and a message 
authentication code algorithm (e.g. CBC-MAC [11]). The
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in turn needs an initialization 
vector (IV) to be defined with it, to ensure semantic security
[5]. In TinySec packet format, the first four bytes of the 
packet make up the IV. The components of the IV are also 
shown in Fig. 4. 
As can be observed, TinySec partitions the last 4 bytes of 
the IV into src||ctr, where src is the address of the sender and 
ctr is a 16-bit counter, used to ensure that the IV for every 
source node is distinct. Each time a sender sends message, the 
ctr value is incremented by 1. 
We re-use the same counter value in our first algorithm, for 
ensuring replay protection, thereby obviating any reason for 
augmenting or changing the existing TinySec packet format. 
In order to handle the possibility of the packets arriving out 
of order, at the destination, we employ a sliding-window. The
window is maintained for each neighbor of the recipient node.
If the value of the counter in received packet is less than that 
received in the previous packet, then it is checked within this 
window. If the same counter value is found within the 
window, then the packet is tagged as a replayed packet and is
dropped. Otherwise it is accepted as a genuine packet and the
counter value added to the window. The principal limitation is 
the polynomial increase in storage, with the increase in the 
number of neighbor nodes of a particular node. Hence, the 
scalability of this algorithm is limited.
However, this algorithm does not require counter 
resynchronization as in SNEP or in MiniSec unicast 
algorithm. The counter value required for replay protection is 
part of IV, so there is no extra overhead in packet size 
involved for this method. Hence, the method incurs very less 
consumption in radio energy. 
It is essential to point out that that we have used this method 
with only the TinySec_AE mode that uses an IV (and a counter 
value therein) for the encryption operation. Thus, we are able 
to make use of the Ctr field because of the support available
for IV. For those applications that demand confidentiality and 
message authentication both, our algorithm directly provides 
a new mode of operation with a new attribute i.e. replay 
protection with authentication and encryption. 
However, for those applications that need only message 
integrity and hence employ the TinySec_Auth mode of 
operation, the IV field is not used; resulting into a different 
packet format as shown in fig. 5. Due to the absence of the Ctr
value here, it would be necessary to modify our algorithm and 
make a provision for the Ctr field separately. Our basic 
algorithm can easily be extended for the purpose.
B. Approach 2: Hash based algorithm
Unlike the previous algorithm, our second algorithm in 
implementing replay protection is TinySec-mode 
independent. Here, as the message type tag, we use a hash 
value generated by a hash function, instead of using a counter 
value. We have used SHA-1 [22] as the hash function. SHA-1 
is a one-way hash function that produces 160-bit output, when 
message of any length less than 264 bits is input. The basic 
algorithm followed for replay detection is illustrated in the 
pseudocode in fig 6.
The recipient computes the hash value from the received 
packet using the hash function agreed upon into the variable 
HashValue. As in the previous case, in order to handle the 
packets delivered out of order, we maintain a window of 
appropriate size to store the previously received hash values.
On receiving the incoming packet, we first apply a hash on 
Algorithm ReplayDetectHash(PacketReceived){
1.
HashValue=computeHashValue(PacketReceived);
2.  for id = 1 to lastValidId {
3.  if (id == DestIDInPacket) {
4.  for window = 1 to last {
5.    if (HashValue ==
HashValueInWindow[window])
6. replayed = 1;
else 
7. replayed = 0
8. InsertHashValueinWindow();
}
}
Fig. 6 Antireplay Algorithm ReplayDetectHash
it. The generated hash value is checked in the window of hash 
values, maintained for this neighbor. If the same hash value is
found within the window, then the packet is considered as a 
replayed packet, otherwise it is considered as a genuine 
packet. For the genuine packets, the hash value is inserted into 
the window. In this method, the out-of-order packets 
therefore, are again automatically handled. 
However, it is emphasized that only the packets replayed 
within the window will be detected as the 
replayed/non-replayed packets.  Hence, the security of this 
scheme largely depends on the size of the window employed. 
Greater the size of the window, more precise the scheme is. 
In addition, this scheme requires higher computational and 
storage resources, due to the complex hash computations and 
the need for storing 20-byte hash values. Therefore, it works 
only for small number of neighbors. However, with a 
light-weight hash function, this limitation can be overcome.
C. Approach 3: Bloom filter based algorithm
In the bloom filter based algorithm, therefore, we use a 
bloom filter to reduce the storage overhead. However, to 
implement a bloom filter m hash functions are required. 
In the first version using the Bloom filter, we use only a 
single hash function. Each node i in the network is required to 
maintain a single bloom filter BFi. For the sake of 
comparison, we employ SHA-1 as the hash function here, too. 
The basic algorithm for replay detection using this method 
is as shown in Fig. 7.
Algorithm ReplayBloomFilter(Packet In, int 
n,
                       Filter BloomFilter)
{
1.  if (!FilterCreated) {
2. Filter CreateBloomFilter(int n, Filter
                             BloomFilter);
3.  FilterCreated=1;
  }
4.  for each received packet {
5.    HashValue=ApplySHA1(TypeTag(Packet
                                      In))
6. if (BloomFilter[HashValue] == 1)
7. return (replayedpacket=1)
8. else {
9. BloomFilter[HashValue] = 1;
10. return (replayedpacket=0);
}
}
}
Fig. 7 Antireplay Algorithm ReplayBloomFilter
On receiving an incoming packet, SHA-1 is applied on the 
whole packet and the bit corresponding to the resulting hash 
value is checked in the bloom filter. Again, the same bit-check 
paradigm, as before is employed. Thus, if the bit is not set, 
then the corresponding packet is treated as a non-replayed 
packet and is consequently accepted. Otherwise, it is tagged 
as a replayed packet.
As mentioned earlier, the memory requirement in such 
scheme is constant; being independent of the number of hash 
functions used as well as independent of the number of nodes 
used – thereby answering the scalability concerns. In addition, 
such an anti-replay policy would detect all the replayed 
packets, resulting in 0% false negative rate. 
Considering the size of Bloom filter to be n and k hash 
functions, after inserting status of p packets in the filter, the 
probability [10] that a particular bit is still 0 is given by
                P0 = 11 1
kp km
ne
n
     
                              (5)   
 Therefore, the probability of a false positive i.e. the 
probability that all the k bits (for each hash function) have 
been previously set is given by [10]
pfalse-positive =  0 11 1 1 1
kkp km
k np e
n
                  
         (6)
However in general, to prevent false positives, the bloom 
filter design criterion specifies tuning of the number of hash 
functions. That is, by selecting the size of the Bloom Filter 
and the number of hash functions, the probability of false 
positives can be lowered arbitrarily [10]. 
The false positive rate for a standard bloom filter 
employing k hash functions is approximately 1/2k [23]. 
Hence, increasing the number of hash functions must result in 
the reduction of false positive rates. However, applying 
multiple hash functions results in increased consumption of 
CPU cycles and thereby energy. 
In order to reduce this as much as possible, we use modified 
version of the previous algorithm, wherein, we use bloom 
filter with eight 32-bit hash functions i.e. theoretically 232
different values per hash function. Thus, the false positive rate 
in our algorithm turns out to be 1/256 i.e. 0.00390. 
Algorithm ReplayBloomFilter8(Packet In, Set 
    HashFunction, int n, Filter BloomFilter)
{
1. if (!FilterCreated) {
2. Filter CreateBloomFilter(int n, 
                  Filter BloomFilter);
3. FilterCreated=1;
  }
4. for each received packet {
5. for i= 1 to k {
6.       HashValue=ApplyHashi(TypeTag(Packet
                                      In))
7.  if (BloomFilter[HashValue] == 1)
8.  return (replayedpacket=1)
else {
9. BloomFilter[HashValue] = 1;
10. return (replayedpacket=0);
}
    }
}
}
Fig.8 Antireplay Algorithm ReplayBloomFilter8
With Bloom filter of length n, a set of k hash functions each 
of size m bits, for each message received at the destination, 
the antireplay algorithm is as shown in Fig. 8.
The eight hash functions that we have employed are from 
the family of universal hash functions, requiring lesser 
computational overhead than SHA-1 viz. RSHash, JSHash, 
PJWHash, ELPHash, BKDRHash, SDBMHash, DJBHash, 
DEKHash, and APHash. 
We carefully implement the bloom filter as 
two-dimensional vector in order to feasibly implement it.
We must emphasize here that for any algorithmic solution, 
the scalability and the impending overhead concerns must be 
dealt with, at the algorithm design level itself. Such concerns 
must not be left out to be tackled in the implementation level. 
As compared to the counter- based algorithm or even the 
SHA-1 hash function based algorithm, we follow the later 
dictum in our Bloom filter based algorithm. The fact becomes 
clearer and tangible with our experimentation results analyzed 
in section VII.
VI. METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS USED
In this section, we describe the platforms and tools used in 
our experimentation and the test application employed.
A. Evaluation Platform & Tools
We have implemented the replay protection schemes 
described, for the Mica2 motes. We have used TinyOS 
version 1.x as the operating system [25] having the integrated 
support for the TinySec library. However, in order to 
incorporate replay protection algorithms, we made 
appropriate changes to the TinySec link layer security 
framework. This includes creation of new modules and 
interfaces as well as modifications in system files of TinyOS.
We implemented our code in nesC [26], the programming 
language used for TinyOS. In addition, to simulate and test 
our implementation, we used the TOSSIM [27] simulator that 
runs on an Intel x86 platform. 
 TOSSIM does not support energy and CPU cycles 
simulations. So, for energy and CPU cycle analysis, we use 
Avrora [28], an instruction level event simulator. Using 
results obtained from TOSSIM and Avrora, we evaluate the 
performance of our replay protection algorithms.
B. Methodology Adopted
We use a simple application that comes bundled with the 
TinySec environment, to test our algorithms. The call-graph 
of the application is as shown in figure 9.
Fig. 9. The TestTinySec Call-graph
Algorithm TestTinySec
1. counter = timer
2. while (counter == fired){
3. if (Send(Data Packet)) then
LED=green
4.    else if( Receive(Data Packet))
     then LED=red
   }
Fig. 10. The TestTinySec Algorithm
The pseudocode of our test application is shown fig. 10.
As can be observed, the TestTinySecM module is the main 
component implementing the application. TestTinySecM
implements a counter that is incremented on firing of the 
timer.  The counter value modified by the component 
Counter, is further passed by TestTinySecM through the 
SendMsg interface for onward transmission over the radio, to 
the component SecureGenericComm. In addition, when the 
message is sent, the Leds interface is used to toggle the LED 
green when the message is transmitted by a mote, whereas to 
turn it red, when the message is received by a mote. All the 
messages are encrypted and authenticated over the air. 
A partial call-graph of the same application with the security 
modules into play is shown in fig. 11. This call-graph was 
generated with the default crypto modules of TinySec – viz. 
the Skipjack cipher [13] wired in the Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) mode for encryption [12] and the Cipher Block 
Chaining Message Authentication Mode (CBC-MAC) [11] 
for message integrity.
The main module of the TinySec library is TinySecM that is 
responsible for invoking all the security related commands.
Fig. 11. The Test Application with Security Components into play
Fig. 12. Our implementation of the Test Application with SHA-1 
function
TinySecC is the configuration file that shows wiring 
between different modules. TinySec does not provide replay 
protection; hence there is no module providing the 
functionality. Next, we show component graph of our second 
algorithm i.e. Hash(SHA-1) based algorithm in figure 12. For 
other algorithms, similar graph can be generated with the 
appropriate change in the name of the module as per the use. 
As shown, we have implemented SHA-1M module which 
provides the interface SHA-1 and is responsible for 
calculating the hash on the message. 
We have also implemented ReplayHashM module which 
provides ReplayHash interface. We modify the TinySec 
configuration files so that TinySecM can use these interfaces 
viz. SHA-1 and ReplayHash and call the commands
implemented therein, to provide replay protection.
VII. EXPERMIENTAL RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
We have evaluated the replay protection algorithms based 
on different metrics viz. memory, energy and CPU cycles. In 
this section, we show our experimental results for these 
algorithms. Based on these results, we propose the suitable 
candidate for implementing replay protection.
A. Storage Requirements
We have used the two parameters viz. 
Number_of_Neighbors and Window_Size to evaluate the 
storage requirements of our schemes for Counter-based 
algorithm and Hash-based algorithm. In figure 13, we show 
the RAM requirements for these two algorithms with varying 
number of neighbors (for a fixed window size of 8).  
The graph is almost linear as increasing the number of 
neighbors, increases the storage requirements, for 
maintaining the state of previously received counter values. 
We maintain the state in 2-byte counter in our counter based 
algorithm. In SHA-1 based algorithm we do so in a 20-byte 
message digest for all the neighbors. 
Hence it is clear that the memory requirement for SHA-1 
based algorithm is higher than that for the counter based 
algorithm. We experienced that the counter based algorithm
works for a maximum of 150 motes, whereas the SHA-1 
based algorithm works for maximum 7 motes with fixed 
window size of 8. 
In figure 14, we show the RAM requirements for the
Fig. 13. RAM requirements for Counter and Hash-based algorithms
with varying number of neighbors for a fixed window-size of 8
Fig. 14. RAM requirements for Counter and Hash-based 
algorithms with varying window-size for a fixed number of 
neighbors
counter based and SHA-1 based algorithms with varying 
window size, but the fixed numbers of neighbors at 5. We can 
see from the figure that the counter based algorithm works for 
maximum window size up to 310, whereas SHA-1 based 
algorithm works for maximum window size set to 13.
In a congested network, the bigger window size will result 
in good performance. Small window size will fail to detect 
most of the   replayed   packets   as   the previously received
packets are continuously being replaced by newly arriving
packets.
However, for the applications with significantly lower 
packet transmission rate, smaller window size can be 
appropriate. For such applications, our scheme works well for 
dense network also.
It is clear from our results that increasing the number of 
neighbors (hence the number of motes) results in increased 
demand for RAM for Counter-based and SHA-1-based 
algorithms. In figure 15, we portray the RAM requirements 
for all of our algorithms including the Bloom-filter based, too. 
For Bloom filter based algorithms, RAM requirements remain 
constant irrespective of number of neighbors.
We summarize the results of RAM usage of all the 
algorithms in Table I. We use the TinySec without replay 
protection as the basis for comparing the percentage increase 
in RAM usage for all the algorithms in a network with 10 
nodes.
Fig. 15. RAM requirements for all of the algorithms
Table I. Percentage Increase in RAM for all algorithms
Method Description RAM 
usage 
(Bytes)
% increase 
over 
TinySec
TinySec without replay 
protection
840 -
Counter Based algorithm 1050 25
Hash based algorithm 4958 489
Bloom filter with single 
hash function
1258 49.7
Bloom filter with 
multiple hash functions
904 7.62
Fig. 16. ROM for all of the algorithms under evaluation
It is clear from Table I that Bloom filter based  algorithm 
with multiple hash functions results in less than 10% overhead 
in memory, at the same time giving good performance. 
This statistic is even more significant than it appears 
because, the advancement in mote technology has shown 
higher growth rate in ROM availability than that of RAM.
Hence, even  with   the   newer   generation   motes,   RAM
remains a scarce resource. Therefore, an algorithm that uses 
fewer RAM is definitely better.
We show the results of ROM usage in figure 16. The 
BF(SHA1) and BF(8 HFs) depict the results for Bloom filter 
with one hash function and that with 8 hash functions 
respectively. The SHA-1 based algorithms require marginally 
higher ROM than other algorithms because of the complex 
computations involved in SHA-1.
B. CPU cycles usage
The results obtained for the CPU cycle requirement of our 
implementation, using Avrora are as shown in figure 17. The 
computational overhead for SHA-1 results in higher number 
of CPU cycles required for SHA-1 based algorithms.
Sensor nodes are deployed in hostile, unattended 
environment. Here, it might not be possible to replenish the 
energy resources and hence, power consumption is a critical 
aspect while designing the sensor network algorithms. 
Power consumption can be minimized by ensuring that the 
CPU cycles consumed are as less as possible. In our 
implementation, we do not require extra overhead in packet 
size. Hence, no extra overhead incurred for transmitting 
additional information.
Fig. 17. The CPU cycles usage for all algorithms under evaluation
Fig. 18. Energy requirements for all algorithms under evaluation
C. Energy Requirements 
The results for the energy requirements of our 
implementation are shown in figure 18. The energy overhead 
incurred is basically for execution of replay related operations 
only which is considerably less as compared to packet 
overhead.
In Table II, we show the percentage increase in the energy 
overhead for all algorithms over TinySec without replay 
protection.
It is clear from our results that our first and last algorithms
incur just 0.06% and 0.17% overhead in energy. As 
mentioned earlier, the counter based algorithm lacks 
scalability. Hence, the bloom filter based algorithm offers the 
best of both worlds. The SHA-1 based algorithm entails 
higher overhead, because of its higher computational 
requirements, as mentioned before.
D. Analysis
Our experimental results clearly demonstrate that counter 
based and SHA-1 based algorithms work only for a limited 
number of nodes in the network due to the limited memory of 
the sensor nodes. For dense network, these two algorithms do 
not give good results. In addition performance depends 
greatly on window size.
For larger window sizes, these schemes give good result at 
the same time demanding higher RAM. Hence, there is a 
tradeoff between performance and RAM. 
Table II. Percentage  Increase in Energy Consumption for all 
algorithms
Method Description % increase in 
energy over 
TinySec
TinySec without replay protection -
Counter Based algorithm 0.06 %
Hash based algorithm 4.14 %
Bloom filter with single hash 
function
3.91 %
Bloom filter with multiple hash 
functions
0.17 %
Fig. 19. Effect of hash functions on false positives
RAM requirements for bloom filter based algorithm are 
constant for any no. of nodes. As shown in Table I, our 
experimental results with 10 nodes, clearly depict that with 
less than 10% increase in RAM, replay protection can feasibly 
be implemented in link layer security architecture.
Bloom filter based algorithm works for any arbitrary 
network. It guarantees 0% false negatives but generates false 
positives. The rate of false positives increases as large number 
of packets is inserted in the filter. Increasing the number of 
hash functions will result in less false positives. We have used 
five hash functions in our algorithm. 
We depict the relation between the false positive rate and 
the number of hash functions used in figure 19.  As can be 
seen, for eight hash functions, the false positive rate is less 
than 0.5. Because of this reason, our last algorithm viz. bloom 
filter with multiple hash functions is the preferred algorithm, 
giving better throughput at the same time keeping memory 
requirement constant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel yet simple algorithm to 
ensuring replay protection at the link layer framework in the 
WSNs. We also justify the need of replay protection at the 
link layer framework only in WSNs, discuss in detail the 
common algorithms for ensuring replay protection in 
conventional as well as the WSNs and evaluate the algorithms
against the novel Bloom filter based algorithm that we 
propose. 
Our experimental results clearly demonstrate that bloom 
filter based algorithm with multiple hash function works well 
with lesser than 0.2% increase in energy and less than 10% 
increase in memory as compared to the one without replay 
protection enabled. 
This work can further be extended with the design and 
implementation of a flexible link layer security framework in 
which as one of the security attribute, our implementation and 
analysis here can be used. We propose the basic design of 
such architecture in [29] that is principally motivated from the 
diverse security requirements of the broad spectrum of WSN 
applications [30]. Such architecture must not only be flexible 
with respect to the security attributes but also the radio 
bandwidth and transceiver chip, motes with a support for the 
next generation motes etc. Our current work is focused on 
implementing the same.
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